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This paper uses time-series techniques to examine whether monetary policy had symmetric
effects across U.S. states during the 1958:1-1992:4 period. Impulse response functions from
estimated structural vector autoregression models reveal differences in policy responses, which in
some cases are substantial.  The paper also provides evidence on the reasons for the measured cross-
state differential policy responses.  The size of a state’s response is significantly related to industry-
mix variables, providing evidence of an interest rate channel for monetary policy, although the state-
level data offer no support for recently advanced credit-channel theories.1
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines empirically how economic activity in each of the 48 contiguous states
responds to monetary policy actions. The idea that policy changes affect states differently is intuitive
given the heterogeneity of state economies and their financial networks. At a deeper level, cross-state
variation in a state’s response to Fed actions can be deduced from traditional and new credit-based
theories [Bernanke and Blinder (1988); Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993); Kashyap and Stein
(1994)] of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.  Still, evidence on the nature and extent of
such differences is limited, in part because of the simplified way in which policy and regional
economic activity have been modeled. Specifically, previous studies have failed to account for  inter-
relationships among sub-national economies and associated feedbacks from policy shocks.
Moreover, existing studies have been restricted to particular regions within the U.S. or Canada, and
no comprehensive look at state responses to a policy change is available. Also lacking is a systematic
analysis of why state economies can respond differently to policy. Existing studies typically focus
on identifying differential responses, but the reasons for any measured differences are unaddressed
or explained heuristically as a function of industry mix.  Nonetheless, state-level data offer a rich
avenue for exploring the empirical significance of possible transmission mechanisms for monetary
policy.  Finally, the manner by which existing studies identify monetary policy shocks and, more
generally, control for the influences of macroeconomic developments appears lacking. This study
contributes to the debate about policy’s sub-national effects by applying a statistical methodology
that handles these important issues neglected in earlier work. 
The effects of monetary policy on real personal income in each of the 48 contiguous states
are studied using structural vector autoregression models (SVARs) estimated over the period 1958:12
to 1992:4.   Impulse response functions from the estimated SVARs reveal a broad pattern in which
state real personal income tends to fall after an unanticipated increase of one percentage point in the
federal funds rate.  The maximum effect on income levels occurs about eight quarters after the policy
shock.  Nonetheless, differences in state responses are evident and, in some cases, substantial.  The
largest response among states (Michigan) exceeded the smallest (Oklahoma) by 2.73 percentage
points.  This compares with an average state response of 1.09 percentage points.  States within the
Great Lakes region are found to be the most sensitive to monetary policy changes,  responding one-
and-a-half times as much as the nation, on average.  States within the Southwest region, by contrast,
are found to be the least sensitive, responding half as much as the nation, on average.
The study then examines which attributes of state-level economies underlie their different
responses to monetary policy shocks.  Several theoretically motivated variables are investigated and,
of these, measures capturing differences in share of gross state product accounted for by a state’s
manufacturing sector are significantly correlated with a state’s response to monetary policy shocks
This finding is taken as evidence for the traditional interest rate channel for monetary policy.  Two
other variables, which proxy for the so-called credit channel of monetary policy, either have no
significant correlation or one opposite to that predicted by theory. Thus, we find no evidence that
a credit channel for monetary policy operates at the state level, despite their possible importance for
individual firms.
 2. SOURCES OF STATE DIFFERENCES IN THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY
Monetary theory suggests several reasons why Fed policy actions can have different sub-
national effects. These include state differences in the mix of industries, in the number of large3
versus small firms, and in the number of large versus small banks.
The Role of Industry Mix.  At the national level, both the timing and impact of monetary policy
actions differ across industries.  In part, these differences arise because of varying interest
sensitivities in the demand for products.  Housing, cars, and other durable manufactured goods have
historically been more responsive to interest rate changes than, say, consumer services.  In a similar
vein, differences in an industry’s response can depend on whether its output constitutes a necessity
or a luxury, and the extent to which demand for the industry’s output is linked to foreign trade and,
thus, the health of foreign economies.
These varying industry responses together with differing industry mixes across states provide
a natural way for monetary policy to have differential state effects.
1  As Table 1 shows, industry mix
differs widely across states.  For example, manufacturing, which is thought to be an interest-sensitive
sector, accounted for about 34 percent of real gross state product (GSP) in Michigan, on average,
during the 1977-90 period, but less than 4 percent of Wyoming’s real GSP.  These state shares can
be compared with an overall average state manufacturing share of 20 percent.
Possible Credit Channels.  Recent theoretical work on possible credit channels for the transmission
of monetary policy actions to economic activity suggests that state differences in the mix of large
versus small firms and large versus small banks could lead to different state responses to monetary
policy.
2  Concerning firm size, Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke (1993), and Gertler and
Gilchrist (1993) argue that monetary policy affects economic activity by directly affecting banks'
abilities to provide loans.  Moreover, significant information costs and transaction costs often require
small firms to deal with financial intermediaries, primarily banks, to meet their credit needs.  Large
firms, by contrast, usually have greater access to external, nonbank sources of funds.  Consequently,4
activity in a state that has a high concentration of small firms could be especially sensitive to Fed
policy.  It is also possible that the greater uncertainty about the health and prospects of small firms
means that they face relatively greater volatility in the costs of all forms of finance (bank loans, trade
credit, commercial paper, etc.) in light of Fed actions [Gertler and Gilchrist (1993); Oliner and
Rudebusch (1995)]. If so, state-level differences in mix of firm size will imply state-level differences
in responses to policy actions.
As Table 2 shows, the percentage of small firms (defined as state firms with fewer than 250
employees averaged over the 1976 to 1992 period) varies widely across states.  It ranges from a low
of about 49 percent in Connecticut to a high of about 89 percent in Montana.  The average state share
is 72 percent. 
A potential role for bank size in the monetary transmission mechanism has been developed
by Kashyap and Stein (1994), who suggest that Fed policy actions can have varied effects on
different banks’ abilities to make loans.  During periods of tight monetary policy when bank reserves
are restricted, some banks can find alternative sources of funding for deposits and loans (by issuing
large denomination CDs, for example) more cheaply and easily than others.  Such lending by banks
will be less sensitive to monetary policy changes.  Kashyap and Stein (1994) propose that bank size
largely explains differences in financing abilities, with large banks having more funding options
available than small banks.  Thus, states in which a disproportionately large share of bank loans is
made by small banks might respond more to monetary policy shifts than states in which a large share
of loans is made by the nation’s large banks.
3  
Kashyap and Stein (1994) define small banks as those with total assets at or below a given
percentile--they use, alternatively, the 75th, 90th, 95th, or 98th percentile.  Table 3 shows the state5
distribution of loans for the nation’s banks that are at or below the 90th percentile in terms of total
assets averaged for the period 1976 to 1992.  Whether we look at all small banks or only small banks
that are not members of a bank holding company, the state distribution of loans by small banks
appears highly unequal, suggesting that monetary policy could have differential state effects for the
reasons proposed by Kashyap and Stein (1994).
4
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Some researchers have investigated the effects of monetary policy on interregional banking
flows as opposed to economic activity.  Studies by Miller (1978) and Bias (1992) have found that
Fed policy actions do affect regional banking flows differentially.  More typical of earlier studies is
the use of a reduced-form, St. Louis-type equation in which personal income, earnings, or
employment is regressed on the high-employment federal government revenues, high-employment
federal government expenditures, and the national money supply.  These models are applied at the
regional level to test the monetarist proposition that monetary policy has an important impact on
nominal income [Toal (1977); Garrison and Chang (1979); Beare (1976), Mathur and Stein (1980);
Garrison and Kort (1983)].
5 
Garrison and Chang (1979) study regional manufacturing earnings in the eight major BEA
regions during the 1969-76 period and find that monetary policy has differential effects across
regions, with an especially large impact in the Great Lakes region and a rather small impact in the
Rocky Mountain region.  Like Garrison and Chang (1979), Toal (1977) concludes that differences
in regional responses to monetary policy changes existed in the 1952 to 1975 period, with relatively
larger responses in the Mideast, Great Lakes, and Southeast regions, and relatively weak responses
in the Rocky Mountain and New England regions. Carlino and DeFina (1998) study whether6
Zs,t ' ( xs,t, xr&s,t, xr2,t,...., xr8,t, c1,t c2,t, c3,t, mt)),
AZs,t ' B(L)Zs,t&1% es,t ,
monetary policy has similar effects across BEA regions in the United States.  Impulse response
functions from a structural vector autoregression estimated over the period 1958:1 to 1992:4 revealed
a core of regions--New England, Mideast, Plains, Southeast, and the Far West--that respond to
monetary policy changes in ways that closely approximate the U.S. average response.  Of the three
non-core regions, one (Great Lakes) is noticeably more sensitive to monetary policy changes, and
two (Southwest and the Rocky Mountain) are found to be much less sensitive. Thus, most past
studies find that the states comprising the Great Lakes region are generally the most responsive to
changes in the money supply, while states in the Rocky Mountain region are least responsive.
6 
4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
The Model.  Economic activity in the 48 contiguous states is modeled using structural vector
autoregressions (SVARs), a methodology that accounts for feedbacks between all system variables
in describing the effects of policy shocks. Formally, we study the dynamic behavior of 48 state-level,
13 x 1 covariance-stationary vectors:
where t indexes time,  xs is real income growth in state s,  xr-s is growth of  real income in the BEA
region containing the state less the state’s real income,  xr2 through  xr8 are growth in the real
incomes of the other seven major BEA regions,  c1 through  c3 are three macroeconomic control
variables, and  m is a measure of monetary policy actions.
The dynamics of Zs,t are represented by:
  
(1)7
Zs,t ' C(L)Zs,t&1 % us,t ,





where A is a 13 x 13 matrix of coefficients describing the contemporaneous correlations among the
variables; B(L) is a 13 x 13 matrix of polynomials in the lag operator, L; and es,t = [ 1,t,  2,t, ··· ,  13,t]´
is a 13 x 1 vector of structural disturbances, or primitive shocks, for each state.  Thus, each of the
system’s variables, including the state’s real income, can be influenced by its own idiosyncratic
shocks and by shocks to all other variables.  The matrices A and B(L) determine how shocks to each
variable are transmitted through the system, both contemporaneously (the A matrix) and in
subsequent periods (the B(L) matrix).  To see this more explicitly, rewrite (1) as a reduced-form: 
(2)
where C(L) = A
-1B(L) is an infinite-order lag polynomial, and us,t = A
-1es,t describes the relationship
between the model's reduced-form residuals and the model's structural residuals.
7
Impulse Response Functions.  The standard way to summarize the dynamic impact of policy shocks
on personal income growth is the cumulative impulse response function.
8  Assuming the system’s




and  l is a k x k matrix of structural parameters.   It is evident from (3) and (4) that the impulse
responses reflect the dynamic interaction of all model parameters subsequent to a policy shock, es,t.
Estimation Procedure and Identification Restrictions.  The elements of B(L) and A are estimated
using  Bernanke’s (1986) two-step procedure.  In the first step, OLS estimates of the reduced-form
errors ut = A
-1et are obtained for the dynamic simultaneous equation model (2).  Sufficient
restrictions are then placed on the variance-covariance matrix of structural errors and on the matrix
of contemporaneous correlations, A, to achieve identification.  Given estimates of A, estimates of
B(L) are derived from the relationship, C(L) = A
-1B(L), where C(L) comes from the estimated
reduced-form (2).  Estimates of A also allow estimates of the structural errors, et, as implied by the
relationship, ut = A
-1et. 
Two sets of standard restrictions are placed on the structural variance-covariance matrix: 
• Structural shocks are assumed to be orthogonal (zero contemporaneous covariance).
• Variances of the structural shocks are normalized to unity.
These restrictions constrain the structural variance-covariance matrix to be an identity matrix.
 Three sets of restrictions are placed on the matrix A. Each is motivated by practical
consideration of time lags in the transmission of economic changes through sub-national and national
economies:
• A state-specific shock affects only the state of origin contemporaneously, although it can
spill over into other regions with a one-quarter lag.
9
•  Fed policy actions, shocks to core inflation, changes in the leading indicators, and changes
in the relative price of energy are assumed to affect state income growth no sooner than with
a one-quarter lag.9
• Neither state income growth nor Fed policy actions contemporaneously affect changes in
core inflation, in the leading indicators, or in the relative price of energy.
Residual changes in the federal funds rate represent the exogenous policy innovations (the
m,t), which are needed to compute the impulse responses.  Four lags of each variable are used in the
estimation, a sufficient number to eliminate serial correlation in the errors.
10 Given these estimates,
impulse responses are calculated using (3).
Variable Selection.  State-level economic activity is measured using real personal income, calculated
by deflating quarterly data on nominal personal incomes for each state during the period 1958:1 to
1992:4 with the national Consumer Price Index (CPI-U).
11    Use of the national CPI-U is forced by
unavailability of state price indices.
12  
   Which  variable best serves as an indicator of monetary policy  has been long debated, both
inside and outside the Fed. The debates have identified several possibilities, including reserve
aggregates (such as non-borrowed reserves), monetary aggregates,  interest rates (in particular, the
federal funds rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate), and so-called “narrative” policy indicators
derived from the official Federal Open Market Committee minutes.  Among the available choices,
the case for using an interest rate appears most convincing both in light of actual Fed operating
procedures and the most recent empirical evidence [see, for example, Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996)].
Thus, we select the federal funds rate as the policy measure.
13
Three variables are employed to control for macroeconomic influences on state economies
and Fed policy decisions.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ “core” CPI (the official index less the
effects of food and energy prices) captures underlying trends in the aggregate price level.  The BEA
index of leading indicators is employed as a parsimonious way to include a variety of10
macroeconomic real-sector variables.  Finally, to account for aggregate supply shocks, an energy
price variable is included in the system.  This variable is calculated as the Producer Price Index for
fuels and related products and power relative to the total Producer Price Index.  It is especially
important to account for energy price shocks given the large changes that occurred during period
studied.
Unit Root Tests.  The variables used in the estimation must be stationary so that standard statistical
theory applies.  We conducted  augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root
tests applied to the levels and first-differences of the system’s variables [Hamilton (1994)]. All
variables except the federal funds rate are expressed in logs.  The unit root null cannot be rejected
at conventional significance levels for any of the data series (in levels) using either the ADF or PP
tests, although stationarity is achieved by first-differencing.  Thus, first-differences of all variables
are used to estimate the models.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Impulse Response Functions.  Figure 1 shows the cumulative impulse responses for each state
resulting from a one-percentage-point increase in the federal funds rate.
14 State responses are grouped
by major BEA region and the weighted average of the state responses, labeled U.S., is included in
each regional grouping as a benchmark.
Concerning the average response, real income exhibits a slight initial rise, followed by a
substantial decline, subsequent to the policy shock.  The maximum cumulative, or long-run, response
occurs, on average, about eight quarters following the policy shock.
15  This general profile is similar
to the estimated impact of monetary policy changes on the U.S. economy as reported in other studies
[see, for example, Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996)].11
The estimated state responses exhibit noticeable within-region and between-region variation
at various horizons.  For example, in the one to two quarters immediately following the policy shock,
many states respond in ways that closely mirror the average response.  Still, responses in a number
of states, ones mainly located in the Plains and the Rocky Mountain regions, show considerable
dispersion around the average.  As the period after the shock lengthens, both within-region and
between-region variation rise as the dynamics fully work through the system.  In the long run, the
real incomes in individual states generally settle down as they approach their new lower levels.
Table 4 contains these long-run, state responses (i.e., cumulative eight-quarter response),
expressed in percentage points.
16 Each state’s relative importance in its region’s income (denoted
“weight”) is provided to help illuminate how a state’s response affects its region’s income growth
and, ultimately, the nation’s.  Related data for the regional aggregates are shown in the lower part
of the figure.
Among the states, Michigan has the largest response (2.7 percent), while five states (Arizona,
Indiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Oregon) respond at least one-and-a-half times as much as
the nation, on average.  By contrast, four states (Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming) are
found to be least sensitive, responding no more than half as much as the nation, on average.
Moreover, across all states, the largest response (Michigan) exceeds the smallest (Oklahoma) by 2.73
percentage points.
Turning to regional differences, the regional responses (equal to a weighted average of
component state responses) range from a low of 0.52 in the Southwest to a high of 1.72 in the Great
Lakes, compared with a national average of 1.09. Real personal income growth in the Rocky
Mountain region also has a relatively small response to monetary policy shocks. Thus, our findings12
match up well relative to earlier studies that found the largest response to monetary policy actions
was in the Great Lakes region and the least response in the Southwest and Rocky Mountain regions.
The high responsiveness of the Great Lakes economy is due both to the generally high
responsiveness of its component states and the relatively large contribution of each state to regional
income.  For the Southwest, Arizona has a sizable response but a relatively low share in regional
income, which helps limit the region’s overall response. The Southeast region has the least within-
region variation as measured by the coefficient of variation, while the Far West region has the most
within-region variation. The coefficient of variation also indicates that between-region variation is
generally much greater than within-region variation.  This can be seen by comparing the regional
coefficients of variation to the coefficient of variation for the U.S. With the exception of the Far
West region, the coefficient of variation (0.31) for the U.S. (average of all regions) exceeds the
coefficient of variation within any of the individual regions.
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6.  WHAT CAUSED THE DIFFERENTIAL STATE RESPONSES TO MONETARY
POLICY ACTIONS? 
Section 2 identified three possible ways by which monetary policy actions could differentially
affect state economies, including differences in the mix of industries, firm size, and bank size.  How
important are these factors in accounting for the different state responses to monetary policy
innovations?
To answer the question, absolute values of the long-run state responses (the estimated
cumulative responses about eight quarters following a policy shock) are regressed on state-level
independent variables that proxy for the hypothesized explanatory factors. Two industry-mix
variables are used  -- the percent of a state's GSP accounted for by manufacturing (taken from Table13
1) and that accounted for by extractive industries.
18  The percent of a state’s firms that are small,
defined as the percent of a state’s firms with fewer than 250 employees (taken from Table 2),
captures the possible effects of firm size.   To account for the bank size effects, we use two
alternative variables: the percent of a state's total loans made by the state’s banks at or below the 90th
percentile in assets nationally; and the percent of a state's total loans made by the state's banks at or
below the 90th percentile in assets nationally and not part of a bank holding company (taken from
Table 3).  The latter variable is used to control for the possibility that a bank can use its parent
corporation as an alternative funding source during periods of tight credit.  Because the estimated
long-run responses represent average behavior during the sample period, averaging the data for the
explanatory variables is appropriate.  Data availability limited averaging to the period from the mid-
1970s to the early 1990s.  Averaging also minimizes the chance that the results depend on the data
for a particular year and helps control for business-cycle dynamics.
Estimated parameters from four cross-state regressions are presented in Table 5.  Models (1)
and (2) contain the four explanatory variables described above.  The banking variable in Model (1)
is measured using all small banks, while the analogous variable in Model (2) excludes banks that are
members of a holding company.  Models (3) and (4) are similar to Models (1) and (2), respectively,
except that dummy variables identifying the region in which a state is located have been included
to control for fixed region-specific factors (the Southeast region is excluded).
19
The results presented in Table 5 reveal that each regression is significant at the 1 percent
level, explaining between 42 percent and 49 percent of the cross-state variation in cumulative
responses.  The percent of a state's GSP accounted for by manufacturing has a positive and
significant relationship to the size of a state's long-run response to Fed policy shocks, while the14
percent of a state’s GSP accounted for by its extractive industries has a negative and significant
relationship.
20  These results appear quite reasonable and are robust to the choice of the loan variable
and to the inclusion of regional dummies.  The importance of manufacturing share can be interpreted
as evidence of an interest rate channel for monetary policy.
We find no evidence that cross-state variation in the mix of small versus large firms matters.
States containing a larger concentration of small firms tend to be no more responsive to monetary
policy shifts than states containing smaller concentrations of small firms.
21  In contrast, we find some
evidence that a region becomes less sensitive to a monetary policy shock as the percent of small
banks in the region increases.  The estimated coefficients are negative in all four equations and
negative and significant in equations 2 and 4.  The finding of a negative sign on the small bank
variable is, however, inconsistent with the theory espoused by Kashyap and Stein (1994).
22  One
possibility for the inconsistency is that a bank's asset size may be a poor indicator of its ability to
adjust its balance sheet to monetary policy actions.  For example, Peek and Rosengren (1995)
suggest that bank capital is a better indicator--better capitalized banks have more and cheaper
alternative sources of funds available.  In addition, Kashyap and Stein (1994) point out that regional
differences in the types of loans being made might also matter, a factor not controlled for in our
study.
7. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper uses time-series techniques to examine whether monetary policy had symmetric
effects across U.S. states during the 1958:1-1992:4 period. Impulse response functions from
estimated structural vector autoregression models reveal long-run differences in policy responses
that, in some cases, are substantial. The response of Michigan, the most affected state, to an15
unanticipated one-percentage-point increase in the federal funds rate was 2.73 percentage points
greater than that of Oklahoma, the least affected state. Nonetheless, state real personal income
generally falls in the periods following an unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate, with the
maximum effect on income levels occurring about eight quarters after the policy shock.
     The paper also provides evidence on the reasons for the measured cross-state differential
policy responses.  We find that the size of a state’s long-run response to a monetary policy shock is
positively related to the share of manufacturing, evidence of an interest rate channel for monetary
policy. A state’s concentration of small firms has no significant effect on the size of the state’s policy
response.  Finally, a greater concentration of small banks is found to decrease the state’s sensitivity
to monetary policy shocks, contrary to predictions of Kashyap and Stein (1994).  Thus, we find no
evidence for a credit channel for monetary policy operating at the state level.  While credit channels
may be important at the firm level, they do not appear to be important in the aggregate.16
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 Table 1: Percent of Gross State Product Accounted for by Manufacturing













































S. DAKOTA   9.0
MONTANA   8.8
NEW MEXICO   6.3
NORTH DAKOTA   5.6
NEVADA   4.5
WYOMING   3.6
average 20.1
std. dev. 7.720
Table 2: Share of Total State Employment Accounted for by a State’s Small Firms





















































Table 3: Share of Total Loans Made by a State’s Small Banks
(averaged over the period 1976 to 1992)









































WASHINGTON   9.6
MASS   8.3
CALIFORNIA   6.1
N. CAROLINA   6.0
DELAWARE    4.8
NEVADA   4.7
ARIZONA   3.6
RHODE IS   3.2
NEW YORK   1.2
average 31.7
std. dev. 22.0






































OREGON   9.3
IDAHO   9.2
NEW JERSEY   8.6
WASHINGTON   8.6
CALIFORNIA   5.6
N. CAROLINA   5.6
MASS   5.5
NEVADA   4.1
RHODE IS   3.1
DELAWARE   3.0
ARIZONA   2.9
NEW YORK   0.9
average 22.6
std. dev.  15.5
aThe percent of loans made by a state’s banks that are  at or below the 90th percentile in terms of total assets (compared
with all banks in the nation).
bThe percent of loans made by a state’s banks that are at or below the 90th percentile in terms of total assets (compared
with all banks in the nation) and are not members of a multi-bank holding company.
Source: Compiled from Federal Reserve Call Reports, Various Years.22
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FIGURE 1:  Cumulative Impulse Response of State Real Personal 
Income to Funds Rate Shock, Grouped by Major Region.23
1e Southeast I
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1g Southwest
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1h Rocky Mountains
PERIODS AFTER POLICY SHOCK
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Figure 1:  Continued.24
1i Far West
PERIODS AFTER POLICY SHOCK
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Figure 1:  Continued.25
Table 4:
Eight-Quarter Cumulative Responses to a One-Percentage-Point Fed Funds Rate Increase
(response in percentage points; weight is the state’s share of regional personal income.)
New England Response Weight Southeast Response Weight
Connecticut 1.2678 0.29 Alabama 1.3261 0.07
Massachusetts 1.0712 0.47 Arkansas 1.3443 0.04
Maine 1.5099 0.07 Florida 1.154 0.22
New Hampshire 1.9264 0.07 Georgia 1.6084 0.11
Rhode Island 1.4391 0.07 Kentucky 1.1599 0.06
Vermont 1.4246 0.03 Louisiana 0.4935 0.07
Mississippi 1.3004 0.04
Mideast Response Weight North Carolina 1.3404 0.11
Delaware 1.0018 0.01 South Carolina 1.2816 0.05
Maryland 0.9174 0.10 Tennessee 1.5632 0.08
New Jersey 1.0607 0.20 Virginia 1.022 0.12




Great Lakes Response Weight New Mexico 0.8182 0.05
Illinois 1.2351 0.30 Oklahoma -0.0741 0.13
Indiana 1.8345 0.12 Texas 0.361 0.69
Michigan 2.6634 0.22
Ohio 1.5378 0.25 Rocky Mountain Response Weight
Wisconsin 1.4604 0.11 Colorado 0.7134 0.50
Idaho 0.9573 0.13
Montana 0.8469 0.11
Plains Response Weight Utah 1.1396 0.19
Iowa 0.8278 0.16 Wyoming 0.1109 0.07
Kansas 0.9653 0.14
Minnesota 1.1982 0.25 Far West Response Weight
Missouri 1.5282 0.29 California 1.1305 0.79
Nebraska 0.8216 0.09 Oregon 1.7168 0.07
North Dakota 0.7427 0.03 Washington 0.9757 0.12
South Dakota 0.8695 0.04 Nevada 1.4356 0.03
Regional Summaries
                     Region Average
Response






New England 1.26 0.06 0.14 0.68
Mideast 0.91 0.21 0.12 0..46
Great Lakes 1.72 0.18 0.09 0.83
Plains 1.14 0.07 0.12 0..69
Southeast 1.23 0.20 0.05 0.91
Southwest 0.52 0.09 0.21 3.60
Rocky Mountain 0.80 0.03 0.15 1.29
Far West 1.16 0.16 0.30 0.64
All Regions 1.09 1.00 0.31 2.5126
Table 5: Explaining Cross-State Variation in Policy Responses
a
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)






















































































2 0.4591 0.4243 0.4734 0.4925
aStandard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicates that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
bNull hypothesis is tested against an alternative hypothesis of a theoretically prescribed positive
coefficient (one-tailed test).
cNull hypothesis is tested against an alternative hypothesis of a non-zero coefficient since an expected
sign is unspecified by theory (two-tailed test).27
1. Interstate input-output relationships can further complicate a state’s response to policy.
2. See Hubbard (1995) for a critical review of the credit channel view of monetary policy.
3. The effect of the differences in states' reliance on small banks will be diluted if bank-dependent
borrowers can obtain credit from sources outside their own states.  However, there is evidence that
banking markets tend to be segmented along state lines.  See, for example, Moore and Hill (1982)
and Hanson and Waller (1996).
4. As a member of a bank holding company, a small bank can issue large denomination (uninsured)
CDs at more favorable rates because it can rely on the financial strength of the larger bank holding
company.  Note also that although the data indicate the location of the lending bank, they do not
specify the location of the borrowers.  One reason for focusing on the lending patterns of small banks
is that they tend to specialize in loans to local customers.  Large banks tend to make loans outside
their local market.
5. Mathur and Stein (1980) question the usefulness of reduced-form, St. Louis-type equations for
analyzing the effects of policy shocks.
6. Beare (1976) uses data for the predominately agrarian Canadian prairie provinces during the
1956-71 period and finds that different provinces respond differently to money supply changes.  
7. The problem of identifying the structural shocks es,t from the VAR reduced-form residuals us,t and
their variances is taken up below.  The solution depends on identification restrictions placed on the
A matrix and on the variance-covariance matrix of structural errors. 
8.  See Sims (1980) for a discussion.
9. This particular identifying restriction effectively deals with issues regarding spatial autocorrelation
of the residuals.  The restriction on the matrix A ensures that each region’s shock is orthogonal to
Endnotes28
all other regions’ shocks, thus eliminating any simultaneous equation bias.  Nonetheless, the model
allows for inter-regional feedbacks through the lag structure of the model.
10. Ljung-Box Q test statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of white noise errors cannot be
rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for any of the system's equations.  The choice of lag
length was also addressed in a restricted way using the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria.
That is, the number of lags of all variables in a particular equation was sequentially varied from one
to eight. These criteria suggested that an optimal lag length was in the neighborhood of two to five
quarters, depending on the equation.  Thus, the choice of four lags appears appropriate on several
grounds.  
11. The SVAR is estimated using the growth in real personal incomes because the level of each
state’s real personal income is non-stationary.  This point is addressed more fully below.
12. Consumer price indexes do exist for many of the metropolitan areas in the various states.  We
found a high degree of correlation in consumer price inflation across these metropolitan areas during
the 1958:1 to 1986:4 period.  The sample ends in 1986 because the BLS subsequently stopped
reporting the CPIs for many MSAs.    
13. For discussions of other possible indicators, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996),
Bernanke and Mihov (1995), Strongin (1995), Gordon and Leeper (1994), Bernanke and Blinder
(1992), and Todd (1990).
14. The model treats increases and decreases of the federal funds rate symmetrically, so that an
unexpected cut in the funds rate temporarily raises real personal income relative to what it otherwise
would have been.  Moreover, given data limitations, we ignore any possible structural changes that
might have occurred during the estimation period.29
15. Monte Carlo simulations (500 replications) performed on quarterly changes in each region’s
income growth indicate that these changes are significantly different from zero for the first eight
quarters following a policy shock and insignificant thereafter.  This result is also evident in the
individual state cumulative responses shown in Figure 1, in that the effects of Fed actions tend to
bottom out between 8 and 10 quarters after the shock.
16. Given the short-horizon volatility in many of the responses and the desire to incorporate all
system dynamics in the analysis, we focus on the long-run responses in which system dynamics have
fully worked through.
17. To examine the robustness of the findings reported in this paper, a number of alternative
specifications were estimated at the regional level.  The regional findings are robust to alternative
measures of monetary policy (nonborrowed reserves and a narrative measure developed by Boschen
and Mills [1995]). The findings are also robust to an alternative measure of economic activity
(employment growth).  Finally, the results are robust whether the variables in the SVAR are
expressed in levels or growth rates.
18. Share of manufacturing is employed to capture state differences in interest sensitivity.  Share of
extractive industries was included to reflect the significant dependence of energy sector production
on foreign economic developments.  Casual inspection of the estimated long-run responses indicates
that states with large shares of extractive activity tend to have relatively small response.
19. White’s test revealed no heteroskedasticity in the estimated errors of either version of the model.
20. A one-tailed test is used for percent manufacturing, percent small firm, and percent small bank
variables because theory unambiguously predicts positive coefficients.  A two-tailed test is used for
percent extractive and for regional dummies, since there are no strong prior beliefs about the signs30
of these coefficients.
21. At the suggestion of a referee, we investigated the possibility that the findings on firm size could
be driven by a failure to account for an  independent effect from the importance of the farm sector
in each state’s economy.  The theory is that agriculture has a unique economic role and that states
with a greater fraction of small firms also have a larger agricultural component to their economies.
Some unique role might be indicated, for example, by the “farm crisis” of the 1980s and,
specifically, the Fed’s contribution.  Thus, our estimates for firm-size effects might be confounded
by the omission of a control for the importance of agriculture.  In any event, we reran the regression
models including two alternative measures of the importance of agriculture in a state’s economy –
the percent of GSP accounted for by farms and the percent accounted for by agriculture.  As with the
other variables, these fractions represent averages for the study period.  The addition of these
variables had no significant impact on the estimated regressions or on the conclusions.  Neither of
the agriculture variables were statistically significant, nor did the significance or magnitudes of the
other coefficients change appreciably.
22. If small banks largely make loans to small firms, this relationship would be captured by the small
firm variable.  There is moderate correlation between the small firm variable and the small bank
variable (simple correlation of 0.5). This correlation helps explain the lack of a positive response of
the bank size variable to changes in monetary policy, but not the estimated negative effect.